Intermediation and (Mis-)Matching in Insurance Markets - Who Should Pay the Insurance Broker?

Publication Type
Journal contribution (peer reviewed)
Authors
Focht, Uwe, Andreas Richter und Jörg Schiller
Year of publication
2013
Published in
Journal of Risk and Insurance
Band/Volume
80/2
DOI
10.1111/j.1539-6975.2012.01475.x
Page (from - to)
329-350
Abstract

This paper addresses the role of independent insurance intermediaries in markets where matching is important. A controversial matter in the discussion concerning insurance intermediation is the issue of compensation customs and how the latter affect prices, rents, and advice quality in insurance markets. This work compares fee-based and commission-based systems. We show that in a situation with a non-strategic intermediary both remuneration systems are payoff-equivalent. In a second step, allowing for strategic behavior, we discuss the impact of remuneration on the quality of advice. This analysis shows that the possibility of mismatching can provide the intermediary with substantial market power, which however, does not translate into mismatching as long as consumers have rational expectations. We offer a rationale for the use of contingent commissions. In addition, this paper addresses whether or not the recent ban of any commission payments as introduced in countries such as Denmark and Finland is an appropriate market intervention. 

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